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Executive Summary: 
The U.S. is investing billions of dollars in developing countries. U.S. development aid is an 
essential part of U.S. foreign policy. The objectives laid down by the architects of development 
aid are wide and range from strategic, economic and social uplift of poor countries to 
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of residents. There is a tense political and 
academic debate about the impacts of development aid funded by the U.S. There are many who 
believe funds support dictators, while others consider aid to be a real help to fragile economies. 
Pakistan is one of the biggest recipients of U.S. development aid but public opinion among 
Pakistanis is divided over of the nature of the aid received. The argument forwarded by some is 
that the aid supports U.S. strategic interests at the expense of social uplift, economic growth and 
good governance for citizens. Others argue that, while not perfectly successful, the development 
aid does help spur the desired development. 
The lower middle income countries that have received U.S. development aid are analyzed with 
cross section panel data of indicators related to economic, social and good governance factors. 
This data are taken from World Bank Data 2010 and the U.S. aid data are from USAID Green 
Book 2010. The U.S. aid received is treated as a dependent variable and social, economic and 
governance indicators are evaluated as explanatory variables. 
The results indicate that U.S. development aid is associated with improvements in economic and 
social indicators, but U.S. aid was not found to be associated with indicators of good governance. 
It is recommended that, while U.S. should better monitor elements of good governance and 
proper use of funds when releasing aid, but it is the major responsibility of recipient countries 
follow good governance practices in order to enjoy the full benefits of foreign funding and attract 
more funding. 
There are many caveats in the study ranging from data limitations to the selection of variables 
and the reliability of model. Despite these deficiencies, it is believed to be a positive addition to 
the few existing studies on this subject. 
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I: Introduction: The United States is investing billions of dollars in developing countries. 
There is a division among the opinions of different groups about the motivation, objectives and 
efficacy of U.S. development aid. There are many who think that this aid is a sort of neo-
colonialism and is not good for the receiving countries. They think that it is used to support 
regimes in the developing countries that are friendly to U.S. interests. According to this view, the 
U.S. often supports dictatorships and the claim is supported by the example of U.S. aid received 
by several Middle East dictatorships (Alesina and Dollar 2000). On the other hand, there are 
many who say that U.S. development aid is doing a lot of good for the citizens in developing 
economies and without the assistance these economies may not thrive. In the presence of such 
strong disagreements, it seems reasonable to examine the matter dispassionately by examining 
whether the amount of U.S. development aid received is associated with indicators of social, 
economic, and political development among low-middle income countries that have received the 
aid. Only the economic and social portion of the U.S. aid that forms 70% of the overall 
assistance is assessed. This is net of the 30% share for peace and security, or military assistance 
(Fig 1). 
Background and definition of aid:  As described by donors, the major purpose of U.S. 
development aid has been to spur economic development and improve social welfare.  U.S. 
foreign aid is an essential part of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign aid has many objectives and in 
2002 these were given as global development, economic growth, poverty reduction and fighting 
HIV/AIDS (Tarnoff 2011). In addition, the U.S vows to support peace, democratization, 
suppress drug trafficking and reduce high rates of population growth. In FY 2010, 39.4 billion 
dollars was earmarked for different programs and types of aid. This accounted for 1.1% of the 
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total federal budget and was the highest level since 1985 (Tarnoff 2011)
1
. Total foreign aid was 
almost 0.2% of U.S. total gross national income, which ranked it third from last among all the 
donor countries of the world. Table1 and Figures 1 and 2 show the details and distribution of 
different categories of aid. 
Table 1 U.S. Aid by Objective and Program Area: FY2010 
Aid Objectives and Program Areas In million dollars 
Peace and Security                10,380.0 
Investing in People 10,929.6 
Governing Justly & Democratically 3,644.2 
Promoting Economic Growth & prosperity 5,212.8 
Humanitarian Assistance 4,975.8 
Total 35,142.4 
 Source: USAID and Department of State budget documents; ForeignAssistance.gov. 
 Notes: Figures encompass State and USAID appropriations only, including supplementals and Iraq and 
             Afghanistan programs. 
Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan, Egypt, and Haiti were highest recipients of aid in 2010. A large 
portion of U.S. foreign aid is tied aid and in 2008 only the bilateral aid has 25% of its portion as 
tied aid. The tied aid means that the recipient of aid is duty bound to procure goods and services 
from the donor country. This increases the cost of goods and services by 15-30% in general and 
40% in case of food purchases. The multilateral aid procurement of goods and services from the 
U.S. increases its share of contributions in that type of aid. The U.S. hopes to receive direct 
benefits of its sale of goods and services in the future along with indirect benefits from 
development of future markets in these economies. If there is economic development then the 
U.S. and the receiving countries would become even bigger partners in trade.  
II: Literature Review: 
                                                          
1
 There is a discrepancy in the figures because the total aid is mentioned for 2010 as 39.39 billion USD but its break 
up adds to 35.14, but this is the data that I have used from the Tarnoff 2011 article and sources are also mentioned. 
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Impact of U.S. Development Aid: There has been an ongoing debate about whether 
development aid is associated with positive or negative effects on the social, economic and 
governance indicators of the aid recipients. There is not a great deal of literature available on 
U.S. aid and its pattern of outflows to recipient countries. I have discussed mostly foreign aid in 
general and priorities of decision makers at the time of allocation. A summary of both sides of 
that debate is presented below.  
Figure # 1. State/USAID Assistance by Objective and Program Area: FY2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, FY2011; House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees; CRS calculations. 
Positive View of Foreign Development Aid: Those who believe that, while not perfect, foreign 
aid generally supports social and civil development in receiving countries offer several 
arguments. A country that is democratizing will receive a 50% increase in aid (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000). Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, and Nicholas Stern give the example of countries 
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like Botswana, Indonesia, Korea, Tanzania and Mozambique which have received more foreign 
aid when they made improvements in social, economic and good governance indicators. It is 
noted that poor countries receive more aid because they have few resources and the aid helps fill 
the gap (McGillivray 2009). Aid has a positive relationship with growth in some countries but no 
such relation exists between measures of health, education and income distribution. Aid is a 
„conditional‟  impact; having greater effect in countries having civil liberties and less effect in 
corrupt and dictatorial regimes. Aid given in times of disaster may be greater in volume but less 
productive due to economic shocks. Levy (1988), is a strong supporter of external economic aid 
to spur economic growth. Foreign aid was found to be more sensitive to political openness; while  
foreign direct investment was found to be more responsive to economic openness (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000). Lumsdaine (1993) paints an ideal position in which “moral vision” guides the 
allocation of foreign aid. Rajan ( 2007) concluded that multilateral aid is less political and should 
have a positive impact.  He analyzed cross country panel data and found no robust evidence for a 
relationship between growth and aid. A recent study concluded that foreign aid helps boost 
investment and savings and can boost further growth if proper monetary and fiscal policies are 
adopted, loans and debt are discouraged, and investment is encouraged (Chaudhry 2009). Poor 
regions like Africa and South Asia, and countries like Congo, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, and 
Somalia received huge amounts of aid but even large amounts of aid did not reduce their poverty 
(Manasse 2009). There is sharp contrast in the motivational factors of multilateral and bilateral 
types of aid (Alseina and Dollar 2000). Japan‟s aid is influenced by the voting patterns at the 
UN, meaning that those who vote in line with Japan get more aid.  
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Figure  2 is a map showing the classification of different countries according to income level. 
The orange colored area shows the lower middle income countries that are included in this 
analysis. 
 
Source: http://chartsbin.com/view/e2x 
Table  2: Names of countries included in the analysis 
# Country # Country # Country # Country 
1 Angola 14 Micronesia 27 Moldova 40 SãoTomé&Principe 
2 Armenia 15 Georgia 28 Maldives 41 Swaziland 
3 Belize 16 Guatemala 29 Marshall Islands 42 Syria 
4 Bolivia 17 Guyana 30 Mongolia 43 Thailand 
5 Bhutan 18 Honduras 31 Nigeria 44 Turkmenistan 
6 China 19 Indonesia 32 Nicaragua 45 Timor-Leste 
7 Côte d'Ivoire 20 India 33 Pakistan 46 Tonga 
8 Cameroon 21 Iraq 34 Philippines 47 Tunisia 
9 Congo, Rep. 22 Jordan 35 New Guinea 48 Tuvalu 
10 Cape Verde 23 Kiribati 36 Paraguay 49 Ukraine 
11 Djibouti 24 Sri Lanka 37 Sudan 50 Uzbekistan 
12 Ecuador 25 Lesotho 38 Senegal 51 Vanuatu 
13 Egypt 26 Morocco 39 El Salvador 52 Yemen, Rep 
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Negative View of Foreign Development Aid: There are also people who believe that U.S. aid 
flows to autocratic and corrupt governments at the expense of social and civil development. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) say that, although foreign aid is positively associated with economic 
growth and good policies, the allocation of aid is not related to the good policies. There are many 
studies that say that more aid, irrespective of the policy environment, will have positive impacts. 
Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) deny any idealism, in their study of Africa, in the motivation 
of donors. They suggest position in the world power game, strategic designs and relations with 
former colonies as motivating factors for aid. U.S. aid was said to be influenced by strategic 
interests in the Middle East. Bourgingnon and Sundberg (2007) tag strategic aid as “bad” aid 
because it is not expected to give good results. Strategic aid means military aid and is mostly  
determined by security related issues  with no concern for public welfare. This may be due to bad 
polices and institutions that are maintained by the recipient governments. Foreign aid is tested 
through strategic cost benefit analysis and is driven by donor interests rather than the good it 
would be expected to do for a recipient country (Afzal 2010). During the cold war aid was more 
strategic and driven by donor interest and bilateral in nature.  After the cold war, a tendency 
toward good development policies was fostered for poor countries, but the share of aid to them 
declined (Burnside & Dollar 2000). Alesina and Dollar (2000) found  that a “closed” former 
colony will get double amount of aid as compared to an “open” former colony. There is 
empirical evidence that corrupt governments receive more aid and increases in aid do not reduce 
corruption (Alesina and Weder 1999). 
Fair (2009) argues that billions of dollars have been sent  by the U.S. to Pakistan when there 
were non-democratic governments and that the aid has not helped in Pakistan‟s economic 
development or creation of peace and conflict reduction. Fair concludes that‟s why there appears 
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to be growing distrust of the aid among Pakistanis. An example of political motives behind U.S. 
aid to Pakistan can be seen in this comment.  
“On the eve of the 9/11 terror attacks, Pakistan teetered on the brink of pariah state status. 
After President Musharraf chose, under considerable pressure, to join the U.S.-led Global 
War on Terrorism, the Bush administration waved sanctions related to the nuclear tests and 
military coup. At a September 24 press briefing, State Department spokesman Richard 
Boucher explained this change of course ―We intend to support those who support us. We 
intend to work with those governments that work with us in this fight [against terrorism]. The 
results were dramatic. In FY 2001, all Direct Overt U.S. Assistance to Pakistan totaled less 
than $90 million with food aid comprising $86 million and $4 million in limited security-
related assistance. There was no economic assistance. In FY 2002, Pakistan received $2.1 
billion, including $665 million in economic aid. Clearly Pakistan did not become needier; 
rather, Pakistan became important within the political contexts of the war on terror (Fair 
2009).”  
Sarantis (2008) argues that foreign aid has negative effects on democracy because it weakens 
accountability, softens budget constraints and lowers pressures for local accountability because 
revenues are not coming from taxes paid by citizens. When the aid comes from a foreign source 
then consumption of the recipient countries increases (Burnside and Dollar 2000). The ruling 
elite do not rely on taxation at home because when taxes increase people will demand for their 
rights. Crawford (1997) concluded that aid sanctions are ineffective and that setting conditions 
on receiving aid have failed to change policies by the aid recipients. The trend of increasing aid 
to new democracies is also said to be harmful (Alesina and Dollar 2000). The damaging effects 
of aid on democracy can to some extent be neutralized if a liberal economic policy is introduced 
prior to initiation of a foreign aid program. This means that if more open economic policies are 
adopted by the recipient country there will be more returns from the assistance (Sarantis 2008). 
Open policies mean transparency in transactions (Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
UN voting patterns are also said to play a role in decisions about giving aid to different countries. 
If someone votes in line with major donor countries, they will not only give that country priority 
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in bilateral aid but also support requests in the decision making body for multilateral aid from the 
IMF and World Bank. There is evidence that the IMF has given aid to countries when they did 
not qualify under the criteria set by IMF. Examples of such countries include Zaire and the 
Philippines during the Cold War, and Russia, Ukraine, Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey during the 
1990s. This is relevant to U.S. aid because when someone voted in line with the U.S. in matters 
before the UN, that country received more multilateral aid because in IMF and World Bank  the, 
United States has great influence in gaining a voting majority
2
 (Carter 2010). Some argue that 
the U.S. gives aid to autocracies and avoids punishing them (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), so 
that they support policies desired by the U.S. There are some autocracies in Middle Eastern 
countries supported by U.S. (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998). The argument of some 
researchers states the reason behind this generosity towards dictators is that it is less expensive to 
get them in line because they don‟t have resort to general public approval for adoption of 
controversial policies (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007). One author asserted that 
democracies are more likely to be punished than dictatorships by the U.S. (Carter 2010). The 
reason given for this tendency is that “democratic leaders have electoral incentives to oppose 
U.S. policy” and when democracies become more developed they become more resistant to the 
pressure of the United States. (Carter 2010). These are some very strong assertions by these 
studies and one may agree with them or disagree with them because some studies can be found 
to support of both sides of the argument.                                                                                      
III: Pakistan: A Case Example of Development Indicators: In order to explain the 
development indicators considered in the analysis they are shown for a specific country. Pakistan 
was chosen for this example because of the author‟s specific knowledge of its history.  
                                                          
2
 In order to make a decision in IMF, it requires 85% vote. U.S. has 20 % of its votes, so no decision can be made 
without the consent of U.S. This is an implicit veto power. 
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Pakistan and U.S. relations are a very complicated affair. There have been many ups and downs 
between the countries, and  currently appear to be based on mutual suspicion. Figure 3 shows 
that the aid dictators received was sometimes higher than that received by democratic 
governments. The red diamonds show a takeover by a military regime and the green triangles 
stand for the year when the democratic government resumed. Pakistan has received a lot of U.S. 
aid, accumulating to billions of dollars. The current analysis considers the years 1981-2007 and 
during that period Pakistan has democratic governments; only from 1989-1999. The decade of 
1990s in Figure 3 shows that aid received during this decade was limited. There may be many 
reasons to explain this trend; for example,  after the culmination of cold war U.S. aid declined all 
over the world but then increased after 9/11 and the following decade.                                                                                                     
Figure 3. The trend of USAID to Pakistan during its whole history 
 
Source: USAID Green Book Data 2010. The red diamonds show the taking over of a military regime. The green 
triangles stand for the year when the democratic system was restored. 
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Figure 4 shows that annual population growth in Pakistan has remained high during the last three 
decades but it has shown a slight reduction in recent years (2002-2007) and in  these years U.S. 
aid inflow was higher than normal. So an correlation might be hypothesized. The reasons given 
for the small decline in population are religious opposition, low status of women and lack of 
education.  
Figure 4. Population Growth 
 
In Pakistan‟s history, the decade of 1990s is called a “lost” decade because the economy was in 
very bad shape during those ten years. But the interesting thing is that it was also the decade in 
which Pakistan witnessed four different short-lived democratic governments, equally divided 
between Benazir Bhutto, first women prime minister of any Islamic country, and Nawaz Sharif, 
for two terms each.  
Figure 9 (Appendix I) shows the trend in the agriculture sector. It is a trend of steady increase. 
Pakistan‟s economy is mostly based on agriculture and almost 65 percent of population is 
directly or indirectly engaged in the agriculture sector. Most of the industrial inputs and capital 
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are also provided by the agriculture sector. Pakistan has always tried to attract foreign investors 
and provided many incentives like tax exemption, but this sector has always remained volatile. 
However, during the last decade the sector has shown some consistency, as can be seen from 
Figure 5.                               Figure 5 . Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Exports are mostly based on agriculture products, textiles and sports items. Despite efforts by 
different governments exports have remained very low. The last decade has shown some 
improvement due to relaxation of quotas in the EU countries (Figure 6).  External debt is a very 
serious issue and Pakistan now has external debt more than 60% of its GDP and this has resulted 
in debt service sometimes reaching 7% of GNI, which is higher even than the poorest countries 
in Africa (Figure 7). There are many other indicators related to economic development, social 
uplift and good governance in Pakistan that can be examined in the appendix. These indicators 
show varying trends. If we compare the volume of U.S. aid receipts (Figure 1) with other 
indicators, it shows that economic and social indicators show a slight relationship but the good 
governance indicators (Figures 16-21 in Appendix I) have no such apparent relationship.   
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Figure 6. Exports of goods and services in constant U.S. dollars (2009) 
 
Examination of a single case does not support the existence or lack of a relationship, but the 
questions raised set the stage for the questions to be addressed through data analysis in the next 
section.                                         Figure 7. Debt Servicing 
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IV: Association between U.S. Aid and Development Indicators:  
The U.S. Agency for International Development Primer lays out a “summary of characteristics of 
assistance that achieves development objectives, including economic growth, democracy and 
good governance, successful social transition.” In order to analyze this statement with respect to 
different development indicators of economic growth, democracy and good governance and 
social inclusion, data was obtained from the World Bank Data available online. The years of 
analysis are 1980-2007. Data regarding annual U.S. development aid to each country for each 
year of the analysis were obtained from USAID Green book edition of 2009.  
Table  3 List of variables 
Economic 
indicators 
Economic 
indicators 
Economic 
indicators 
Social Indicators Governance 
Indicators 
Current Account 
Balance 
GDP Public and 
Publicly 
Guaranteed debt 
Life Expectancy at 
birth 
Control of 
Corruption 
Net trade in goods 
and services 
Crop Production 
Index 
Total reserves in 
months of imports 
Population above 
65 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Direct Investment Food Production 
Index 
CPI Population Growth Political Stability 
and absence of 
violence/terrorism 
Industry 
Grants Direct investment 
(% of GDP) 
Inflation  Regulatory quality 
Exports Current Account 
Balance  
(%  of GDP) 
Government 
Consumption 
 Rule of law 
Principal 
repayments on 
debt 
External debt  
( % of GNI) 
Total Debt service 
( %  of GNI) 
 Voice and 
accountability 
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Three different classes of indicators are considered as explanatory variables and USAID is the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables include economic, social, and governance 
indicators as major categories. The data for all the explanatory variables is from the World Bank 
and is the latest data that is open for public use. Although there is much missing data among 
various indicators, there is still sufficient data to make the analysis possible. I have used lower 
middle income countries for the analysis because they are major recipients of the USAID and 
more data is available for them. Initially, I intended to include the low income countries but most 
of the data for the above mentioned variables was missing, so in the absence of many indicators 
the analysis may have become biased. The names of the countries used in this analysis are given 
in the Table 2. They are 56 in World Bank data and definition but for 4 of them data was not 
available showing receipt of U.S. aid during the period under study. These 4 countries are 
Vietnam, Kosovo, Gaza and Samoa. The location of these countries can be seen on map in 
Figure 2. The orange color represents lower middle income countries. The majority of these 
countries belong to the two continents of Asia and Africa.  
The three categories of the variables are intended to represent the major objectives of USAID as 
shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. My expectation is that when a country is doing well on 
governance indicators, USAID is predicted to be larger. In the same manner, when social 
indicators show positive progress, such as when life expectancy increases, USAID be found to be 
higher. In the same manner, if the population growth declines it would be expected to be 
associated with more aid. As far as the economic indicators are concerned, they will have 
different responses in different cases. I have used cross section time series panel data for this 
analysis in order to control for the characteristics of countries that do not change over time. The 
country has been used as a control variable for the fixed effects.  I used robust regressions to find 
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the relationships of the indicators with the dependent variable of USAID. I have also used factor 
analysis in order to address collinearity among independent variables and also to find the 
collective impact of various categories of explanatory variables on the dependent variable. An 
important thing about the data is that for the economic and social indicators, and USAID, data is 
available from 1981-2007 (27 years), while for the governance indicators data is only available 
for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2007 (total of 9 years) 
V: Results: The results of regressing the whole list of economic and social indicators on USAID 
with robust standard error are shown in Table 4. We find three significant results for industry, 
GDP and CPI. The first one is positive and can be interpreted as the association between 
increases in the industrial sector of lower middle income country and USAID flow increasing in 
order to help boost production so that the country can stand on solid economic footing and can 
be a partner in trade in future. But it can be otherwise as well because when industry is 
increasing then the lower middle income country could become more self-reliant such that aid 
flow would decline. GDP has the expected negative sign because an increase in GDP means that 
less aid is needed. CPI also has negative sign implying that an increase in CPI  is associated with 
aid reductions. None of the social indicators show significant results in this model. The negative 
sign of population growth is as expected because we have already assumed that an increase in 
population is not in line with the family planning and population control objectives so USAID 
would be reduced when these policies fail to produce results.  
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Table 4 USAID is regressed on variables in Table 3 with robust standard error less governance 
USAID      Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Current Account Balance    .2730161 0.248576 1.10 0.273 
-0.2163453 0.7623774 
Net trade in goods and services  -.4420412 0.2817353 -1.57 0.118 
-0.9960544 0.111972 
Direct Investment   .2516115 0.1854854 1.36 0.176 
-0.1131327 0.6163558 
Grants 1.8172 1.908803 0.95 0.342 
-1.93633 5.57073 
Exports   .0284334 0.0508662 0.56 0.577 
-0.0715914 0.1284582 
Principal repayments on debt    .3463147 0.2538266 1.36 0.173 
-0.1528179 0.8454474 
Industry   .2038093 0.0956953 2.13 0.034 
0.0156311 0.3919875 
GDP  -.1302536 0.0590791 -2.20 0.028 
-0.2464286 -0.0140787 
Crop Production Index     .031015 0.0276766 1.12 0.263 -0.02341 0.0854392 
Food Production Index .0752275 0.0642469 1.17 0.242 -0.05111 0.2015647 
Direct investment (% of GDP)    2.873533 1.612822 1.78 0.076 -0.29797 6.045036 
Current Account Balance (%  of 
GDP) .3735517 0.4812026 0.78 0.438 -0.5727 1.319804 
External debt ( % of GNI) - .0004539 0.0461856 -0.01 0.992 -0.09127 0.0903669 
Total Debt service( %  of GNI)   .2986428 0.3522273 -0.85 0.397 -0.99127 0.393988 
Public and Publicly Guaranteed 
debt   .3901826 0.3629276 1.08 0.283 -0.32349 1.103855 
Total reserves in months of 
exports .6183692 0.9629416 0.64 0.521 -1.27519 2.511928 
CPI -.1311258 0.0499825 -2.62 0.009 -0.22941 0.0328385 
Inflation -.0036024 0.0075199 -0.48 0.632 -0.01839 0.0111849 
Government Consumption    .317482 0.4972018 0.64 0.524 -0.66023 1.295195 
Life Expectancy at birth .6168457 0.3861569 1.60 0.111 -0.14251 1.376197 
Population above 65 -1.046554 2.683626 -0.39 0.697 -6.32372 4.230611 
Population Growth -4.640577 2.65449 -1.75 0.081 -9.86045 0.5792948 
Constant -23.19401 28.31656 -0.82 0.413 -78.8766 32.48856 
sigma_u 15.98737 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
sigma_e 19.528221 
rho .40128271 
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As far as the Governance indicators are concerned, when they were included, they did not show 
any significant results
3
. Moreover, when they were included, the other economic indicators 
previously having significant results also became insignificant (Table 1 Appendix II). I have 
observed two important things here. One is the strong impact of governance as a factor and 
second the presence of collinearity in many variables. So I have created factors in order to avoid 
collinearity and also to find whether other variables that are not significant individually can show 
some significant results as a factor, as it was seen in the case of governance. First I want to show 
the collinearity among different variables.    Table 5 Correlation in variables 
Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
Industry 189.76 0.00527 
GDP 116.31 0.008598 
Current Account Balance 107.18 0.00933 
Grants 67.9 0.014728 
Exports 66.79 0.014971 
Direct Investment 13.89 0.072009 
Principal repayments on external debt 6.8 0.147103 
Population above 65 3.11 0.321368 
Population growth  3.09 0.323675 
Total Debt service( %  of GNI) 2.81 0.356196 
Public and Publicly Guaranteed debt 2.66 0.376267 
food  2.48 0.402697 
CPI 2.13 0.469695 
Total reserves in moths of exports 1.88 0.531242 
Life expectancy at birth 1.63 0.615137 
External debt ( % of GNI) 1.6 0.625475 
Consumption of government  1.28 0.77967 
Grants 1.26 0.792871 
Current Account Balance (%  of GDP) 1.26 0.793307 
Crop production index 1.26 0.795821 
Inflation 1.03 0.971624 
Mean VIF  28.39 
 
                                                          
3
 The t-test results for Industry, GDP and CPI are 0.49, -1.05 and .0.01 respectively (see table 1 appendix 1). 
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This Table 5 shows that first six variables are highly correlated to each other. I have created 
some factors that are given in Table 6.  
Table 6 Factors created to further analyze the data 
Governance  Economic 
Health 
Healthcare Agri- Sector Deficit 
Financing 
Control of 
Corruption 
Industry Life Expectancy at 
birth 
Food Production 
Index 
External debt  
( % of GNI) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
GDP Population above 
65 
Crop Production 
Index 
Total Debt service 
( %  of GNI) 
Political Stability 
and absence of 
violence/terrorism 
Current Account 
Balance 
Population Growth   
Voice and 
Accountability 
Grants    
Regulatory quality Exports    
Rule of law Direct Investment    
 
Table 7 shows the results using the newly created Economic Health factor and Healthcare factor 
while all the other variables were the same as above. Total debt service is significant but the sign 
is negative. That means that when a country‟s debt service increases by one percent, USAID 
decreases by 0.42 billion dollars. The Food Production Index also shows significant and negative 
results. It can be interpreted that, as a country rises on the food production index by one point, it 
will lose USAID by 0.17 billion dollars. This is very logical because when a country gets self-
sufficiency in food it will lose the food aid element of USAID. In the same manner, if a country 
shows good results on the healthcare factor its share of aid will see a huge increase up to 8.73 
billion dollars.   The external debt variable has a negative sign and its p-value 0.065. It means 
that these two variables on debt are related to USAID significantly at the 0.1 level. 
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Table 7 USAID is regressed on Economic Health and Healthcare factors less Governance factor 
USAID Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.  Interval] 
Economic Health 0.333608 0.281612 1.18 0.237 -0.21918 0.886392 
Total Debt service( %  of GNI) -0.42567 0.170695 -2.49 0.013 -0.76073 -0.09061 
Total External debt (% of 
GNI) -0.02333 0.01264 -1.85 0.065 -0.04814 0.001476 
Food Production Index -0.17258 0.063765 -2.71 0.007 -0.29774 -0.04741 
Crop Production Index -0.00117 0.009215 -0.13 0.899 -0.01926 0.016916 
Healthcare  8.733833 4.090916 2.13 0.033 0.703651 16.76402 
_cons  31.17832 6.803378 4.58 0 17.82376 44.53287 
sigma_u  14.50324 
 
sigma_e  20.04826 
rho  0.343544 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
Table 8 has all the same variables as in theTable 7 with only the addition of the Governance 
factor. The debt service and total external debt variables remain significant with varying degrees 
and have similar negative signs as above but the food index loses significance.  
Table 8 USAID is regressed on Economic Health and Healthcare factors with Governance factor 
USAID Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Economic Health -0.34497 0.335414 -1.03 0.305 -1.00547 0.315525 
Total Debt service( %  of GNI) 0.533191 0.29006 1.84 0.067 -0.038 1.104378 
Total External debt (% of GNI) -0.10516 0.042413 -2.48 0.014 -0.18868 -0.02164 
Food Production Index -0.03495 0.087428 -0.4 0.69 -0.20711 0.137212 
Crop Production Index -0.03125 0.02734 -1.14 0.254 -0.08509 0.022586 
Healthcare  15.88104 10.25943 1.55 0.123 -4.32184 36.08393 
Governance  12.79862 9.443043 1.36 0.176 -5.79663 31.39388 
_cons  14.96796 10.85005 1.38 0.169 -6.39798 36.33389 
sigma_u  25.80521 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
sigma_e  24.38763 
rho  0.52822 
 
Table 9 (Appendix II) shows the results from the last two factors created by combining the debt 
service and total external debt for deficit financing and food index and crop index for 
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agricultural-sector factor. Here we use all the factors except Governance. The result shows that 
once again only deficit financing is important and it also retains its negative sign. This shows 
that USAID is related to debt factor whether incorporated singularly or as a factor. 
In the last Table 10 (Appendix II) of our analysis we see the result from the similar variables but 
with the governance factor as well. The result is very interesting, it shows that the economic 
health factor is now significant and its sign is negative. It shows that USAID is explained by the 
economic factors in a better manner. Nowhere in the whole analysis is there a significant 
relationship between good governance and USAID. Although on the face of it seems a bit 
unwelcome outcome but still it can be explained that the limited data on the governance factor 
may be one reason that it is not significant. Moreover, we can also refer to our earlier 
observation when examining the different indicators for Pakistan where it did not appear that 
governance indicators like control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability, rule of law,  political stability/absence of terrorism etc. (Tables 16-21 Appendix 
I) had a relationship with USAID. 
V: Recommendations: 
Keeping in mind these results, one can give recommendations to both the U.S. administration as 
well as the aid recipient countries.  
1. The recommendation for the U.S. administration is that USAID is going in the right 
direction as far as economic and social factors are concerned. But the good governance 
factor needs greater attention from policy makers. Findings may partially support the 
claim that USAID goes to dictatorships that have no concern for good governance and the 
political and human rights of the people. This may be due to the strategic interests of the 
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U.S. which play a major role when deciding to release USAID to recipient countries. One 
cannot deny the fact that strategic interests of a donor country are important, but still to 
achieve those aims should never be the single consideration in granting aid. There should 
be some tradeoffs and in case choice is between democracy and dictatorships, one can 
safely say that a democratic government, while difficult to deal with, is likely to give 
better results.  
2. Another recommendation is that closer scrutiny of the aid be required so that fundsnot go 
into the pockets of military generals, politicians or bureaucrats leaving the problems of 
regular citizens unaddressed. . This would improve one of the governance indicators, the 
control of corruption. 
3. The U.S. is at this moment the top contributor of development aid. Still, its total 
contribution equals only 0.2% of its gross national income. If this contribution is 
increased to 1% level, as envisaged in the millennium development goals (MDG)
4
, then 
the U.S. can engender much more economic, social and good governance development.  
The recommendation for recipient governments, such as Pakistan, reflect the fact that the 
available data indicates that billions of dollars of U.S. aid does not appear to have produced all 
the desired results, especially on indicators of good governance.  
1. There is need to establish and empower institutions that can closely monitor the use of 
USAID in future so it can achieve  its maximum effect. After the restoration of 
                                                          
4
 In the millennium development goals it was envisaged share of developed countries for foreign aid will 
be increased up to 1% of their GNI. My recommendation emanates from that proposal, because although 
US is the biggest contributor in dollar terms but it is at the number 3 from lowest in GNI terms. 
Scandinavian countries are at the top with over 0.75 % of GNI share and Saudi Arabia has 0.69 % 
contributions for foreign aid. 
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democracy in the country for the last 3 years, the people of Pakistan have not seen much 
improvement in the indicators. There should be a serious review of how the aid was 
spent.  
2. The one consistent result found in this paper is that USAID is most closely associated 
with the economic growth indicators
5
 but to expect that it will be able to strengthen 
public institutions and good governance may be expecting too much. Each  domestic 
institution should work vigilantly within its constitutional parameters to protect 
democratic transparency and accountability. A free press and a free judiciary are the most 
effective methods to enhance good governance indicators.  
3. Like many lower middle income countries, Pakistan has a huge external debt, and also a 
large debt servicing burden that it has to address quickly; because without addressing this 
issue future inflows of aid, and even foreign direct investment, will likely remain very 
low.  
4. USAID cannot be seen as a panacea for all ills. Better management and self-reliance in 
revenue generation is required. That can  become weakened if a country is fed for a long 
time on foreign aid. Pakistan is can be seen as an  example, where the taxes are paid by 
only 1.5% of the total population (Daily Dawn Jan 7, 2011). There are fewer than 2 
million tax payers in a population of 180 million. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Significant results from table 1 for industry, GDP and CPI, from table 7 for Food Production Index and 
total debt servicing and from table 8 for total external debt are evidence in this regard. 
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VI: Caveats: 
There are many caveats in the present study. It is a new model and the variables used in this 
model may not be the optimal factors to use in analyzing USAID. The data are very limited and a 
lot of missing data points make the results vulnerable to some misinterpretations.  
The USAID data used year 2009 as a base year to convert it to constant dollar while the World 
Bank data has used year 2005 as base year to convert its data into o a constant dollar. The World 
Bank data was converted by using its own atlas method. This may also be regarded as a caveat 
and it may affect the output to some extent. 
VII: Conclusions: 
Overall, the results in this study are not very encouraging in the case of good governance and 
democracy indicators. But the economic development indicators are encouraging in the sense 
that they are showing significant relationship between aid decisions and the economic condition 
of a country. The debt situation of a country seems to play an important role in decisions about 
aid distribution. In future it will likely play an even more important role in the future because 
there is growing concern within the U.S. itself about its own 14 trillion dollars debt.  
While there are very few studies of U.S. development aid that can provide guidance for the 
analysis, there are studies of multilateral aid that could be instructive. U.S. development aid is an 
important portion of overall aid, accounting for the largest share from all donor countries. It 
could be instructive to compare and contrast the results of the varying effects of aid from other 
donor countries with the U.S. development aid in future research. Whether USAID plays a 
decisive role in the allocation of other grants either multilateral or bilateral, is an empirical 
question that should be analyzed? 
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IX: Appendix I 
Figure  8 Aid Program Composition, FY2010. 
 
Figure # 9. 
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Figure 10. Total Reserves 
 
Figure 11. Price Hike 
 
 
 
 32 
Figure 12 Inflation 
 
Figure 13 Industry 
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Figure 14 GDP 
 
 
Figure 15 Life Expectancy at birth 
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Figure 16 Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 
 
Figure 17 Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 
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Figure 18 Political Stability and Absence of violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank 
 
Figure 19 Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 
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Figure 20 Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 
 
Figure 21 Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 
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X: Appendix II 
Table 1 
USAID Coef. 
RobU.S.t 
Std. Err. T P>|t| 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Current 
Account 
Balance 0.078181 0.913064 0.09 0.932 -1.72758 1.88394 
Net trade in 
goods and 
services -0.42942 0.893868 -0.48 0.632 -2.19722 1.338373 
Direct 
Investment 0.074798 0.19419 0.39 0.701 -0.30925 0.458846 
Grants 3.74602 6.842851 0.55 0.585 -9.78703 17.27907 
Exports 0.183808 0.155529 1.18 0.239 -0.12378 0.491396 
Principal 
repayments 
on debt 0.095968 0.40705 0.24 0.814 -0.70905 0.900988 
Industry 0.117625 0.241166 0.49 0.627 -0.35933 0.594578 
GDP -0.16869 0.160842 -1.05 0.296 -0.48679 0.149405 
Crop 
Production 
Index -0.03437 0.131156 -0.26 0.794 -0.29376 0.225016 
Food 
Production 
Index -0.07025 0.158141 -0.44 0.658 -0.38301 0.2425 
Direct 
investment 
(% of GDP) -1.33745 3.419411 -0.39 0.696 -8.09999 5.425095 
Current 
Account 
Balance (%  
of GDP) 1.581401 1.014006 1.56 0.121 -0.42399 3.586794 
External debt 
( % of GNI) -0.06357 0.113483 -0.56 0.576 -0.28801 0.160862 
Total Debt 
service( %  
of GNI) -0.8921 0.766705 -1.16 0.247 -2.40841 0.624205 
Public and 
Publicly 1.047402 0.720485 1.45 0.148 -0.3775 2.4723 
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Guaranteed 
debt 
Total 
reserves in 
months of 
exports 1.263795 1.455625 0.87 0.387 -1.61498 4.142572 
CPI -0.00219 0.154874 -0.01 0.989 -0.30849 0.3041 
Inflation -0.14981 0.312526 -0.48 0.632 -0.76789 0.468269 
Government 
Consumption -1.07987 1.186204 -0.91 0.364 -3.42581 1.266078 
Life 
Expectancy 
at birth 2.459172 2.886961 0.85 0.396 -3.25035 8.168692 
Population 
above 65 -3.0619 11.20165 -0.27 0.785 -25.2153 19.09152 
Population 
Growth -5.02011 13.30322 -0.38 0.706 -31.3298 21.28956 
Governance  26.54239 20.5955 1.29 0.2 -14.1892 67.27396 
_cons  -104.917 127.3228 -0.82 0.411 -356.722 146.8888 
sigma_u  35.22182 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
sigma_e  26.06254 
rho 0.64619 
 
Table 9 USAID is regressed on Economic Health, Agricultural-sector, Deficit Financing and 
Healthcare less Governance 
USAID Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%Conf.Interval] 
Economic Health 0.16096 0.5482 0.29 0.77 -0.945 1.267 
Agri-Sector -5.3086 5.6299 -0.94 0.351 -16.67 6.053 
Deficit Financing -5.927 3.07087 -1.93 0.06 -12.124 0.270 
Healthcare 4.10906 6.89964 0.6 0.555 -9.815 18.033 
_cons 11.308 0.47234 23.94 0 10.354 12.261 
sigma_u 13.1383 
 
sigma_e 20.1024 
rho 0.2993 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
Table 10 USAID in billion dollars is regressed on Economic Health, Agricultural-sector, Deficit 
Financing and Healthcare with Governance 
USAID Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.  Interval] 
Economic Health -0.498 0.242 -2.06 0.046 -0.987 -0.010 
Agri-Sector -0.628 2.915 -0.22 0.83 -6.519 5.263 
Deficit Financing 1.215 2.884 0.42 0.676 -4.613 7.043 
Healthcare  18.138 10.745 1.69 0.099 -3.578 39.854 
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Governance 12.485 9.138 1.37 0.179 -5.984 30.954 
_cons  4.000 3.840 1.04 0.304 -3.760 11.761 
sigma_u  25.378 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
sigma_e  24.386 
rho  0.520 
Table 11  Summary Statistics for the analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
year 1404 1994 7.79 1981 2007 
Control of corruption percentile 
rank 406 33.40 18.67 0.97 77.67 
Government effectiveness 
percentile rank 406 34.41 18.57 0.49 80.58 
Political stability and absence of 
violence  percentile rank 436 35.72 24.06 0.48 98.56 
Rule of law percentile rank 449 34.80 20.22 0.48 77.14 
Regulatory quality percentile rank 404 33.40 17.16 0.98 76.58 
Voice and accountability 
percentile rank 
457 36.82 21.90 .48 93.30 
Crop production index 1325 94.58 38.11 32 462 
Food  production index 1314 91.85 32.06 27 462 
Foreign Direct investment % of 
GDP, net outflows 491 0.20 0.73 -1.40 12.77 
Net trade in goods and services 1102 3.00E+08 1.29E+10 -3.87E+10 3.07E+11 
Foreign Direct investment (BoP) 993 1.21E+09 6.49E+09 -4.55E+09 1.21E+11 
Grants 1193 2.11E+08 4.88E+08 120000 1.14E+10 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 1095 79.95 100.55 0.28 1210.06 
Total debt service % of GNI 1094 6.27 6.32 0.00 107.37 
Total reserves in months of 
exports 1053 3.30 2.51 0.03 17.26 
CPI 1323 47.97 38.52 0 127.45 
 40 
General government expenditure 
(% of GDP) 1101 16.20 7.75 1.38 58.31 
Industry value added 1107 1.75E+10 8.01E+10 2609835 1.20E+12 
GDP 1273 4.30E+10 1.67E+11 4.04E+7 2.46E+12 
Life expectancy at birth 1353 62.60 7.72 36.32 76.04 
Population at 65 and above (% 0of 
total) 1350 4.35 2.19 1.89 16.16 
Population growth (annual %) | 1404 1.92 1.24 -2.40 11.18 
U.S. Aid (constant dollars) 
dependant variable 1404 53.02 309.25 0 8147.10 
Country_id 1404 26.5 15.01 1 52 
Good Governance 388 3.20E-10 0.97 -1.84 2.02 
 
 
 
